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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




ROBINSON MARTIN QUINTANILLA SUAREZ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A79-732-377)
Immigration Judge: R.K. Malloy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 2, 3008
Before: MCKEE, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges





Robinson Martin Quintanilla Suarez (“Quintanilla”), a native and citizen of Peru,
petitions for review of a final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”),
2ordering his removal from the United States.  
I.
Quintanilla entered the United States on or about April 4, 1999, at Miami, Florida. 
He was placed in removal proceedings pursuant to a Notice to Appear dated February 24,
2003.  At a master calendar hearing on April 29, 2003, Quintanilla conceded the charges
and sought relief through adjustment of status, based upon his marriage to Luzmila
Quintanilla, a United States citizen, pursuant to INA § 245(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a).  At the
conclusion of the merits hearing on October 18, 2005, the IJ granted Quintanilla’s
application for adjustment of status and accompanying waiver of inadmissibility under §
212(i). 
On November 16, 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) appealed
the decision and filed a motion to reconsider.  Concluding that the government’s motion
was untimely and therefore not permitted, the IJ reopened the proceedings sua sponte to
consider a package of documents that the government had not provided in Quintanilla’s
original merits hearing.  The documents reflected that Quintanilla had used a fraudulent
birth certificate indicating that he was born in the United States territory of Puerto Rico. 
Quintanilla allegedly used this fraudulent birth certificate in an attempt to obtain a
passport from the United States.  Although Quintanilla was never charged for this
conduct, the IJ concluded that the evidence clearly supported his removal, pursuant to §
237(a)(1)(A) of the INA, as an alien who had sought to procure a United States passport
3by fraud in violation of INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i), an offense for which a waiver is not
available.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).  
Following that hearing, the IJ issued an amended decision, revoking the grant of
adjustment of status and the waiver of inadmissibility due to Quintanilla’s fraudulent
claim of U.S. citizenship, and ordered him removed to Peru.  Quintanilla filed an appeal
with the BIA.  Concluding that the IJ reopened the case sua sponte, the Board found that
the IJ’s decision to reopen was governed by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1), which vests total
discretion in the IJ to reopen a case on his or her own motion.  As a result, the Board
explained that the IJ was not constrained by the language in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3),
which requires a party show that evidence sought to be offered is material, was
unavailable and could not have been discovered at the former hearing.  The Board further
concluded that the IJ did not violate Quintanilla’s due process rights by admitting the
evidence, and thus affirmed the IJ’s decision.  Quintanilla filed a timely petition for
review.  
II.
Quintanilla argues that the IJ abused her discretion by reopening his case sua
sponte.  The threshold question is whether we have jurisdiction to review this argument. 
In Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, we held that we had no jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
decision to invoke its sua sponte authority to reopen a case under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a),
because that authority “is committed to [the agency’s] unfettered discretion.  Therefore,
4the very nature of the claim renders it not subject to judicial review.”  320 F.3d 472, 474
(3d Cir. 2003).  Although we have not yet held that the same analysis applies to the IJ’s
discretionary authority to sua sponte reopen a case, the two provisions governing the IJ’s
and the BIA’s authority to reopen a case are similar in all respects.  As such, the analysis
in Calle-Vujiles governing this Court’s jurisdiction to review discretionary Board
decisions applies equally to sua sponte decisions by an IJ.  Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)
(defining the BIA’s authority), with 8 C.F.R. 1003.23(b)(1) (defining the IJ’s authority). 
Like the regulation governing the BIA’s authority to reopen a case, the regulation
providing an IJ’s sua sponte reopening authority states that an Immigration Judge “may
upon his or her own motion at any time, or upon motion of the Service or the alien,
reopen or reconsider any case in which he or she has made a decision, unless jurisdiction
is vested with the Board of Immigration Appeals.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1).  As we
explained in Calle-Vujiles, “the view that decisions not to sua sponte reopen or reconsider
are non-reviewable is based on Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).”  320 F.3d at
474.  In Heckler, the Supreme Court held that courts have no jurisdiction to review
matters “committed” to an agency’s discretion, including cases where the court has no
meaningful standard of review against which to measure an agency’s exercise of
discretion.  470 U.S. at 830. 
Quintanilla argues that, consistent with Heckler, there is a meaningful standard of
review to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.  See 470 U.S. at 830.  That standard
     At least one Court of Appeals has concluded there is no meaningful standard by1
which to review an IJ’s discretionary decision not to exercise his or her sua sponte
authority to reopen a deportation proceeding.  See, e.g., Enriquez-Alvarado v. Ashcroft,
371 F.3d 246, 248-50 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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is whether “exceptional circumstances” existed by which the IJ should have properly
disregarded federal regulations relating to motions to reopen.  See Matter of J-J-, 21 I&N
Dec. 976 (BIA 1997).  In Matter of J-J-, the BIA recognized that the applicable regulation
permits the Board to reopen proceedings sua sponte in “exceptional situations.”  Id. at
984.  Quintanilla has not cited one case applying the “exceptional situation” language in
the context of the IJ’s sua sponte power under § 1003.23(b)(1).  Moreover, we considered
and rejected this argument as it applies to the Board’s discretion in Calle-Vujiles, 320
F.3d at 474-75, reasoning that  “in In re J-J -, the BIA acknowledged only that [§
1003.2(a)] allows the Board to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations; it did not
hold that the regulation requires the Board to reopen proceedings in exceptional
situations.”  Id. at 475.  Because the IJ, like the BIA,  “retains unfettered discretion to
decline to sua sponte reopen or reconsider a deportation proceeding, this court is without
jurisdiction to review a decision [ ] to exercise such discretion to reopen or reconsider the
case.”  Id.   1
Although we are constrained from reviewing the IJ’s discretionary reopening of
Quintanilla’s case, we are not limited in our ability to review his arguments that the BIA
violated his right to due process by affirming the IJ’s decision to admit evidence that he
6falsely represented himself as a United States citizen in order to obtain a U.S. passport. 
This purely legal argument requires no determination of the limits of the IJ’s discretion.
To be successful in a due process claim, a moving party must show that he was
prevented from reasonably presenting his case.  Uspango v. Ashcroft, 289 F.3d 226, 231
(3d Cir. 2002).  At the reopening hearing, at which Quintanilla’s counsel was present, the
IJ gave Quintanilla the opportunity to respond to the Government’s evidence, which had
been provided to him well in advance of the hearing.  (See A.R. at 191.)  The evidence
included a sworn statement that Quintanilla had “executed a passport application at
Lehigh County Courthouse” using someone’s name and “submitted a Puerto Rican birth
certificate as proof of U.S. Citizenship.”  (A.R. at 217-18.)  There was no indication that
Quintanilla did not voluntarily sign the statement and Quintanilla did not offer any
defense to the evidence except his father had undergone a major surgery.  (See A.R. at
189.)  The evidence considered by the IJ satisfies this Court’s test for admissibility as it
was relevant, probative, and its use was not fundamentally unfair.  See Ezeagwuna v.
Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003).  Accordingly, we find no due process
violation.  
Finally Quintanilla argues that the BIA erred in concluding that the government
presented sufficient evidence to support a finding that Quintanilla made a false claim to
U.S. citizenship.  We have reviewed the record and conclude that the Board’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence.  
7III.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition will be dismissed in part and denied in part. 
